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Abstract: Continuous development of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has opened up
enormous opportunities for the engineers to enhance the efficiency of the machines. Despite the
development, many industry administrators still fear to use Internet for operating their machines due
to untrusted nature of the communication channel. The utilization of internet for managing industrial
operations can be widespread adopted if the authentication of the entities are performed and trust is
ensured. The traditional schemes with their inherent security issues and other complexities, cannot
be directly deployed to resource constrained network devices. Therefore, we have proposed a
strong mutual authentication and secret key exchange protocol to address the vulnerabilities of the
existing schemes. We have used various cryptography operations such as hashing, ciphering, and so
forth, for providing secure mutual authentication and secret key exchange between different entities
to restrict unauthorized access. Performance and security analysis clearly demonstrates that the
proposed work is energy efficient (computation and communication inexpensive) and more robust
against the attacks in comparison to the traditional schemes.
Keywords: authentication; industrial internet of things (IIoT); industry 4.0; protocol; security
1. Introduction
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) alias Industry 4.0 is the new era of the industrial revolution
which uses the sensor and actuators for the enhancement of the production and manufacturing
industrial process. IIoT is the 4th generation of the industrial development. The first generation (1.0)
industries of 18th century made use of steam power to generate resources for their industry. The next
revolution took place is industry 2.0 in the year 1870 where industries ran through electricity and
assembly lines. Second revolution brought attention of engineers towards industrial development.
The 3rd progress (3.0) in industrial development escalated the efficiency to a par level. It introduced
the concept of computer and Programmable Logic Control (PLC) which was believed to be the first
step towards automation of industries. The recent advancement of industry 4.0 uses additional
infrastructure to connect industrial processes with the internet; thus permitting the engineers to control
the machines remotely as well as allowing them to get instant access of the information through cloud
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storage [1]. The whole era of industrial transformation along with the various significant applications
of IIoT is depicted in Figure 1.




























Figure 1. Industrial transformation and various applications of Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT).
IIoT is converging many traditional practices into intelligent and smart processes, few of the
applications are illustrated in Figure 1 like supply chain optimization in warehouses, automotive
manufacturing in industries, remote power generation monitoring and control in smart grids, recycling
and sorting of waste products, and so forth. Another reason of motivation to industry owners for
revamping their industries is the advancement in the field of micro electronics and ICT (Information &
Communication Technology). The fundamental aim behind the evolution of IIoT is Machine to Machine
(M2M) communication without human intervention [2]. M2M communication makes use of various
equipment’s such as radio frequency identification (RFID), sensors, mobile devices, and wireless
sensor networks (WSN) to achieve automation and seamless connectivity with other devices [3,4].
In addition, Internet of Things (IoT) enabled the industrial machines to upload the data on clouds for
quick analyzing and decision making; thus eliminating the need of physical entries and analysis [5].
Industries with large manufacturing units are widespread adopting IIoT and have started making
their machines IoT enabled. Some of the recent examples of its adoption are shown in Figure 2.
Tech Mahindra (TM) is using IoT for monitoring and controlling painting and logistics section
(transferring vehicle from production to manufacturing house). The use of IoT in TM enabled the
workers to view the status of the assets anytime and anywhere. In addition, IoT strengthened the
equipment and process diagnostic capabilities to reduce the time requirement from production to
manufacturing [6]. Another application is implemented in Rio Tinto: Mine of the Future, the British
and Australian mining industry [7]. They have launched an innovative automated mining machine
in Pilbara, a remote region of Western Australia with the deep reserves of iron ore. The Driver less
trucks and trains haul ore away from the mining sites while an autonomous drill technology enables a
remote worker to oversee status of multiple drills from a single console. The company has a control
center complex in Perth that connects to its mines as well as its rail and port operations, where the
programmers, engineers, technicians, and analysts are remotely monitoring and guiding mining
operations [7]. IIoT is a boon to industry owners as they can remotely visualize the performance of the
staff, machines along with the status of the ongoing projects [8,9].




Figure 2. Few use cases of IIoT.
Modern ambush on cyber physical networks and systems upraise a solid security anxiety as
such attacks can cause loss to customers, service providers, developers, and manufacturers [10,11].
The unknown vulnerabilities in the system like bugs, and broken processes, and so forth pave way to
cyber attacks. Cyber attacks may result in loss of data privacy and integrity, illegal access to privileged
zone, financial loss, and business disruption, and so forth. Inadequate or inappropriate security
measures in IIoT can even lead to collapse of the whole industrial system. The setback of the industry
operators happened due to news of attacks on IIoT networks: a network was created for controlling
lights, fan, fire detection, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) at Sochi arena for
Olympics. But during inspection in 2018, it is found that 17,823 building automation control network
(BACnet) devices and 78,000 supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices were exposed
to internet without security protections. During investigation, the prime reason found is vulnerability
in mutual authentication and key exchange protocol, that led the attackers to exploit the network
resources [12].
Forbes reported an incident where attackers used malicious programs and communicating devices
to harness the industrial network illegally. Attackers took over the charge of excavators, scrapers,
and cranes, and so forth from the legitimate managers of the firm [13]. Another incident is informed by
the security analyst firm, Zimperium Inc., USA. According to their report, IoT enabled electric scooter
manufactured by Xiaomi Inc., China was accepting control commands for example, locking, braking,
and acceleration, and so forth from even illegitimate users [13].
As thoroughly discussed in Reference [14], many IoT networks do not even possess basic
security elements. On average, these are the cyber-security analysis of today’s COTS IoT products:
25 vulnerabilities are detected per device, 60% have vulnerable firmware, 70% do not encrypt any
communications at all, and 80% fail to request a password for authentication that has a secure length.
There are few ways to protect IIoT against intrusions and cyber-attacks. One of them is allowing
intrusions to happen and then detecting them via Intrusion Detection Systems [15], as discussed
in Reference [16]. Alternatively, robust mutual authentication and secure key exchange procedures can
be used to protect IIoT against attacks [17,18]. This article aims at providing a remedy by proposing:
A Lightweight Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for Industrial Internet of Things (MAKE-IT).
The motivation behind the proposed work is the limitations of the existing mutual authentication
and key exchange protocols. The computation, message exchange, and communication cost of
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conventional protocols are large enough to drain the resources of the IoT constrained devices.
These factors pave way for new mutual authentication and key exchange protocols that satisfy the
requirements (robust and lightweight) of IoT networks.
MAKE-IT protocol protects the unauthorised access to industrial network through secure
mutual authentication and key exchange process. Data confidentiality and integrity, to name a
few, are ensured throughout the mutual authentication and key exchange process. MAKE-IT has
significantly optimized the computation and communication processes in comparison to traditional
protocols. Our network consideration covers industrial network settings in which private/off-the-grid
network implementations are elected such as SCADA, Device Language Message Specification
(DLMS)/Companion Specification for Energy Metering (COSEM), Modbus, and so forth. Here in
our proposal, Authentication Server acts as a gateway in between the trusted industrial network site
and un-trusted outside world. Therefore, users are treated as potential threats and authentication
credentials are verified accordingly. Other than IIoT, our proposal might also be applicable to very
specific subset of IoT, such as home automation systems where outside world connects the inside
network via dedicated/trusted gateways. In this article, we have concentrated on private networks
that are operating at industrial sites. This might be considered as a subset of IIoT in which the network
is considered as secure, whereas end-users (operators, foremen, engineers, etc.) that are trying to
read/write/execute commands at the industrial devices are considered to have potential threat to
the industrial network due to various reasons: wireless communications, various attack landscape
(Man-in-the-middle attack alias MITM attack, impersonation, etc.).
The remaining paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the security protocols developed
by peers. Section 3 presents the system and adversary model, and Section 4 describes the proposed
scheme. Section 5 provides the formal and informal security analysis whereas Section 6 discusses the
performance and comparative analysis. Section 7 draws the conclusions.
2. Related Work
Esfahani et al. [2] have discussed the role of Machine to Machine (M2M) communication in
implementation of IIoT networks. As the nodes in the IIoT are resource constrained, therefore authors
only utilized XOR and hashing operations to build the algorithm of authentication. The authors
declared that their scheme provisions mutual authentication, confidentiality, session key, and so forth
and is also resilient to replay, impersonation, and modification attacks, and so forth. The scheme
proposed is simple yet secure but the communication, message exchange, and computational cost is
large enough to drain the resources of the IoT constrained devices. Hence it may pose as a hindrance
to the networks with sensitive resource constrained devices.
Li et al. [3] emphasized on the need and challenges of security in IoT due to unsecured open
wireless channel and resource constrained devices. The authors suggested a three factor user
authentication protocol to combat against legitimacy threats. The proposed protocol is claimed
to be energy efficient and resistant to replay, impersonation attacks, and so forth. Xu et al. [19] have
also disclosed a scheme for authentication of multi gateway wireless sensor networks connected with
IoT based on 3 factor mechanism. Formal analysis using ProVerif proved that scheme is resistant
against many potential attacks. However, as per Reference [20], both the protocols drain a significant
amount of precious energy reserves on accomplishment of 3 factor security. In addition, the discussed
protocols [3,19] consumes a lot of communication and computational overhead, therefore imposing a
restriction on its practical realization for WSN-IoT resource constrained use cases.
Rao et al. [21] investigated and found that most of the devices on the internet are vulnerable
to unsecured channel which may lead to exploitation of privacy. Authors have presented a light
weight hashing method for user authentication in IoT. They proposed a customized BLAKE2b hashing
algorithm with some modified elliptic curve digital signature scheme (ECDSA). The authors have
compromised with the security in order to lessen the expenditure of communication and computation.
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The protocol is not verified for its resistance against the most basic attacks mentioned in Dolev-Yao [22]
attack model, thus response of this scheme against attacks is very much unpredictable.
Das et al. [23] raised the concern of security and privacy of the information exchanged over the
unsecured medium. Additionally, the authors discovered that existing schemes cannot be deployed
in all use cases of IIoT due to their heavy computation and communication overheads. To overcome
the aforementioned issues, the authors introduced a new privacy preserving user authentication
scheme for IIoT environment. The scheme utilizes biometrics, fuzzy extractors, one way hash function,
and XOR, and so forth to accomplish the authentication between the entities. The scheme makes use
of smart card and biometrics together for verifying the authenticity of the entities. The authors have
verified the robustness of their approach using Real or Random (RoR) model and declare their scheme
as resistant against attacks. The proposed scheme is implemented in NS2 for operational performance
evaluation. Despite the advantages, the scheme is energy expensive due to size and quantity of the
messages exchanged during the authentication phase.
Li et al. [24] discussed the various applications where Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) and IIoT
are integrated to perform the tasks. The motivation of the authors to introduce a new security protocol
is the threat of sensor node being accessed by an illegitimate user. The authors introduced the Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) based authentication protocol for IIoT networks to overcome the deficiency
of user anonymity and other vulnerabilities of the existing protocols. Their proposed algorithm used
biometrics, fuzzy extractor, one way hash, and XOR for accomplishing the aim of authentication.
The authors claimed their approach as secure based on the formal security analysis performed using
the random oracle model. Post analysis, the scheme is simulated in NS3 (Network Simulator) to
understand the behavior of the approach in the WSN-IoT environment. Regardless of the advantages,
the scheme has not been tested against the potential attacks (e.g., MITM, etc.) that may prove fatal
for the protocol. The scheme also lacks in ensuring message freshness and data confidentiality for all
shared information due to absentia of nonce and ciphering mechanisms, respectively.
Paliwal in Reference [25] has highlighted the significance of WSN in gathering information
from remote areas. The author emphasized the communication challenges due to the open nature
of the channel and further advised the need for strong security protocols to preserve integrity
and confidentiality. But it becomes a challenge in WSN, as the computing nodes have limited
resources. The author has performed cryptanalysis on the existing techniques to prove the presence of
vulnerabilities. A new mutual authentication and key exchange protocol has been proposed to address
the deficits of the existing techniques. The new advised protocol exhibits various security features like
integrity, conditional privacy, and so forth. The strength of the scheme against the attacks is analyzed
using AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications), RoR model,
and informal analysis. The author claimed the scheme as robust and lightweight. Although the scheme
exhibits various security attributes but still lacks in achieving overall privacy and identity anonymity.
Besides the security attributes, substantial use of hash, and the large size of message overhead adds a
burden on the overall scheme.
Chang et al. [26] demonstrated the weaknesses (e.g., inadequate secrecy, and impersonation
attacks, etc.) of the existing security protocol through cryptanalysis. The authors introduced a
new efficient and flexible smart card based authentication scheme for Ad hoc WSN to address the
aforesaid security issues. The authors devised two protocols, wherein the Protocol (P1) overcomes
the deficiencies of the existing protocol under scanner, and the Protocol (P2) provides secrecy to Ad
hoc WSN with further modifications in P1. However, the P1 does not protect from all threats but
lightweight, whereas, P2 is stronger but resource expensive. Therefore, the selection of either protocol
for the IIoT applications is a compromise. Despite the two solutions, the desire of a strong security
protocol with limited computations remains unachieved.
Gope et al. [27] pointed out the various constraints (e.g., coverage, connectivity, and security, etc.)
in the implementation of Industrial WSN (IWSN). The authors gave more importance to the security
and privacy aspect as the information is exchanged over the unsecured medium with little human
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interventions. The real-time relaying of information in IWSN creates a requirement of a robust
authentication protocol to protect the network from unauthorized abuses. The authors introduced
a physically secure mutual authentication protocol for IWSN. The protocol uses hash, physically
unclonable functions (PUF), and XOR as crypto primitives to accomplish the process of mutual
authentication. The significant feature claimed by the authors is the protection of sensor nodes data
even if it is physically captured by the adversary. The security features offered by the protocol are
mutual authentication, and secure key exchange, and so forth. Nonetheless, the protocol exchange
6 large-sized messages during the authentication and key exchange phase. As IWSN make use of
sensor nodes with limited resources, therefore deploying this protocol can reduce the active lifetime of
the devices and network.
In the IoT domain, there are some standardization efforts to provide authenticated key exchange
for constrained devices [28]; such as Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) [29] and
Compact Transport Layer Security (CTLS)/Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) v1.3 [30]
handshake protocols. But it is investigated by the authors of Reference [31] that TLS (1.3)
implementation errors can make the network vulnerable to Cache-like ATtacks (CATs), thus limiting
its scope of utilization for sensitive networks for example, Industrial IoT. Also, the time sensitive
information generated by manufacturing execution systems (SCADA, PLC, etc.) in Industrial IoT
requires ultra low latency message exchanges. Therefore, industrial IoT network seeks a framework
with limited number of layers and functionalities than TCP/IP [32]. Moreover, researchers argued that
TCP/IP was originally developed for connecting mainframe computer to wired networks; therefore
originally designed protocol stack of TCP/IP is not adequate enough to cater to the IoT architecture
needs [33]. Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and researchers are trying to develop better
alternatives. Due to inconclusive and inadequate standard architecture solutions, vendors are offering
scalable, need specific (QoS, latency, etc.) and multipurpose IoT network architecture for private IIoT
networks [34,35].
There are many alternatives proposed to TCP/IP protocol stack for Industrial IoT applications.
Modbus Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) is an open standard used by the industries for performing
the industrial tasks with critical timing requirements [36,37]. Similarly, Low powered wide area
network (LPWAN) is recommended for Industrial networks (IIoT) because they are energy inexpensive
and support long range communications [38–44]. Moreover, the latest version of LoRaWAN (v1.1)
has shown to be secure against the vast majority of cyber-attacks and threats [45–47]. Hence,
LoRaWAN is a secure and stable protocol that can be safely used not only for IoT applications
but also for industrial ones. Various alliances and consortiums have been formed to build private
LPWAN (open specifications) for various industrial applications, for example, DASH7 [48], LoRa [49],
MIOTY [50,51], and Weightless [34], and so forth. DASH7, LoRa, and MIOTY, do not operate on
TCP/IP stack rather operates on open protocol stack to provide flexibility to the IT administrator of
the industry to choose the set of protocols based on application requirements (Quality of service (QoS),
time sensitive, etc.) [52].
Recursive Internetwork Architecture (RINA) is also a good alternative to TCP/IP as it gives
flexibility to manage the layered operations without interrupting the real time traffic. Moreover,
RINA is claimed to be more secure than TCP/IP architecture as it secures the layers instead of
protocols [53]. The review of available architectures [31–53] discloses the incompleteness of TCP/IP
for IIoT networks and influence of open standards (LPWAN, RINA, etc.) for industrial applications.
Apparently, the security protocols advised in TCP/IP stack may not be compatible with the open
architectures, thereby opening vulnerabilities and posing threats to the security of the network.
Conclusively, research is still in progress to develop the security protocols for open architecture based
IIoT networks that can offer complete security solutions with limited utilization of resources.
It is important to note that security scheme proposed in this paper is specifically devised for open
architecture based private IIoT networks.
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2.1. Research Gaps
1. Most of the schemes studied in References [2,3,23–27] are found vulnerable to potential attacks.
2. Security features offered in References [2,3,23–27] are insufficient for sensitive IoT networks.
3. Traditional schemes [2,3,23–27] are computation and communication expensive.
2.2. Our Contribution
1. To encounter the threats, we have proposed a lightweight mutual authentication and key exchange
protocol for IIoT (MAKE-IT).
2. To strengthen the security measures and achieve robustness, asymmetric and symmetric key
cryptography have been used along with other crypto primitives such as hash and XOR, and so
forth.
3. MAKE-IT exhibits various security features like data confidentiality, identity anonymity, mutual
authentication, and prevention from unauthorized access, and so forth. Formal and informal
analysis of MAKE-IT proves its capability to resist against these attacks: replay, modification,
MITM, and impersonation attack.
4. MAKE-IT accomplishes mutual authentication and secret key exchange with high computational
and communicational efficiency in comparison to existing schemes [2,3,23–27].
3. System and Adversary Model for Make-It Protocol
3.1. System Model
The system model describes the relationship between User, Gateway (GW), Authentication Server
(AS), and IIoT nodes. Figure 3 illustrates their relationship with each other.
Authentication Server








Figure 3. System model.
3.1.1. User
User could be industry manager, owner, administrator, and so forth who has privilege to control
the machines, fetch the data from IIoT nodes, and so forth. User may access the network using any
digital gadget like computer, laptop, and mobile, and so forth which has the capability to compute
cryptography operations along with communication unit. User also requests the AS for generating the
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security credentials. Later, user utilizes the obtained credentials to generate the secured session key
with the GW .
3.1.2. Gateway
Gateway (GW) provides the interface to user for getting connected to the IIoT network.
The gateways are not necessarily powered up through mains, rather depends upon the use case
of IIoT. The present system model is constructed considering those applications of IIoT where GW
is also a resource constrained node, for example, an industrial network deployed near volcano for
monitoring eruptions, and extracting volcanic minerals, and so forth. GW receives partial security
credentials of user from AS which is later utilized by GW to verify the legitimacy of the request.
As communication to all the nodes of IIoT network is possible via GW , any vulnerability in GW could
compromise the whole network.
3.1.3. Authentication Server (AS)
AS is a trusted entity whose prime responsibility is to validate the users and other devices of the
network. It is assumed that user IDs are stored offline in the AS. The users request for the security
credentials from AS. Upon being validated, AS provides a random secret integer to the user which is
further utilized by the user to generate secret key with the gateway. AS is considered to be tamper
proof entity and has no resource constraints.
3.1.4. IIoT Nodes
Industrial machines are integrated with sensors (motion, proximity, vaccum, and pressure, etc.)
and low power transceiver module (e.g., bluetooth, Zigbee, WiFi, etc.) for providing instant access
to control and monitor the infrastructure of the industry. Legitimate users (manager, engineer, etc.)
communicates to IIoT nodes via gateway. Note that this protocol is implemented to secure the network
from external threats. Therefore, security considerations and message exchanges between user and
gateway are only considered.
3.2. Adversary Model
MAKE-IT protocol has adopted the Dolev-Yao (DY) adversary model for evaluating the security
performance under compromised conditions [22]. The threat model assumes that the attacker is
competent enough to discover the vulnerabilities of the protocol; these vulnerabilities can be used
by the attacker for mounting various attacks. Consider an industrial IoT network deployed near the
volcano for monitoring eruptions and extracting volcanic minerals. Following the DY threat model,
the user and the gateway (a network device communicating to autonomous mining machines, assembly
lines, and driverless tipper trucks, etc.) are under threat in IIoT. Assume an attacker can eavesdrop all
the communications happening between the user and the gateway. More precisely, an attacker can
capture and replay the message for getting unauthorized access for example, machines, information,
and so forth. In addition, an attacker can impersonate as an authorized user to steal precious
information of volcanic minerals or locations where precious minerals are being kept. The adversary
can try to modify the timestamp of the messages to get illegal access to the system to introduce
malware for either disrupting or degrading the operations of the industry. The attacker can intercept
the messages exchanged between the user and the gateway to extract the security parameters that
are useful to approximate the future secret keys. The adversary can construct and inject new bogus
messages to overwhelm the resources of the network device (gateway); as a result, the privileged user
fails to deliver the messages to the gateway. Conclusively, the operational workflow of the industry
will suffer and may result in financial and reputation loss.
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4. Proposed Protocol: MAKE-IT
Assume a Industrial IoT environment where industrial machines are controlled and monitored
over internet via gateway. Remote user can control and monitor the IIoT nodes after proving the
legitimacy to gateway. Therefore, any vulnerability in authentication procedure could allow external
attacker to access the network resources. In order to ensure legitimacy and avoidance of unauthorized
access, we propose a light weight remote user authentication model. Note that in order to run the
proposed protocol, we have assumed that gateway is resource constrained device and believe that
all communications to industrial nodes happen via gateway. It is further assumed that clocks of all
participating entities are synchronized to each other. The proposed protocol consist of two stages:
User device registration phase, and Mutual Authentication & Secret Key Generation Phase.
4.1. User Device Registration Phase
Table 1 presents the notations that are used to describe the working of the protocol. Note that
some Greek symbols have been used to represent variables; besides storing values, the symbols do not
have any mathematical perspectives.
Table 1. Notations and Descriptions.
Notations Description Notations Description
UID, GID The user and gateway id RN Random secret
SU , PU Source and port address of user LU , MU Location and MAC address of user
SG, PG Source and port address of gateway LG, MG Location and MAC address of gateway
SK Shared secret key PRG, PRAS Private key of gateway and AS
h, ⊕ The hash and XOR operation || Concatenation operation
MN , TN Messages and timestamps PUG, PUAS Public key of gateway and AS
In this phase, User approaches Authentication Server (AS) to show his interest towards
communication with Gateway. Users’ device initially prepares its identity details, β (SU || PU ||
LU || MU || UID). In addition, user adds a timestamp (T1) to message β, to prevent replay attacks.
Finally user encrypts the message (β || T1) and sends it to AS for obtaining security credentials (random
secret). Figure 4 illustrates the complete process of user device registration with the AS.
AS receives the message (ε) from the user and decrypt it using private key, D(PRAS, ε). AS verifies
the lifetime of the request by compiling the timestamp values (T2 − T1), fresh messages are processed
and expired/replayed messages are discarded. Post timestamp verification, AS compares the received
user identity, UID with the offline stored user identity, UIDS for verifying the authenticity of the
request; the session is aborted if comparison is not true. AS computes hash of decrypted message (τ)
to preserve integrity. Further AS splits the hashed message (O) into two equal parts: O1 and O2. O1 is
utilized for processing of security credential request, whereas, O2 is later utilized as a temporary key
for securing the communications between AS and user. Afterwards, AS generates the random secret
integer, R1 and prepares the message (Σ = O1 || R1 || T2) for gateway. Eventually Σ is encrypted with
the public key of gateway, E(PUG, Σ) to safeguard confidentiality. The encrypted message, E(PUG, Σ)
is then sent to GW .
Gateway receives E(PUG, Σ) from AS, decrypts using private key, D(PRG) and forms λ. Before
processing the message further, gateway verifies the timestamp of the message, T3 − T2. Upon
successful validation, gateway computes W = hash (SG || PG || LG || MG || GID). Gateway splits
the hashed message (W) into two equal parts: W1 and W2. W1 is utilized for processing of request,
whereas, W2 is later utilized to securely exchange the random secret of GW with the user. Further,
gateway computes W1 ⊕ O1 and concatenate timestamp T3 to compose Ψ. Ψ is a useful component
of protocol as it reflects a relationship between user and gateway. Additionally, Ψ is encrypted with
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the public key of AS, Θ = E(PUAS, Ψ) to attain data confidentiality. The encrypted message (Θ) is
forwarded to AS for further processing.
A.S decrypts the message D(PRAS, Θ) using its private key. Upon successful decryption, freshness
of the message is verified, T4 − T3 followed by generation of random secret integer, R2. AS computes
Ω = O1 ⊕ R2, assembles Ψ || Ω || T4, and encrypts the assembled message to form YAS = E(O2, (Ψ || Ω
|| T4)). The encrypted message YAS is sent to the user. AS has utilized a secure mechanism to share
the random secret with the user. As no one else know O1, therefore only user is able to retrieve R2.
User on the other hand, generates O by computing hash(β). The generated value O is splitted
equally into O1 and O2. Using O2, user decrypts the received message, YU = D(O2, (Ψ || Ω || T4)).
Post successful decryption, the user verifies the validity of the message, T5 − T4. Upon verifying the
genuineness, user computes the random secret integer, R2 = Ω ⊕ O1.
USER GATEWAY
β = (SU || PU || LU || MU || UID)
ε =	E(PUAS	,	ϑ)
O = hash(τ)
Split O equally into O1 and O2,
Generate  R1, 
 λ	= D(PRG, φ)
W = hash (SG || PG || LG || MG || GID)








	 (T2 - T1) ≤		∆T	if not true then abort,



















UID == UIDS if not true then abort,
YAS = E(O2, (ψ || Ω	|| T4))
YU = D(O2, (ψ || Ω	|| T4))
O = hash (β)
Split O equally into O1 and O2,
Figure 4. User device registration phase in MAKE-IT Protocol.
4.2. Mutual Authentication and Secret Key Generation Phase
In this phase, User and GW mutually verifies the legitimacy of each other before finalizing the
secret key. User initially retrieves W1 (= Ψ ⊕ O1) and constructs ZU (= E(W1, (Ω || T5)). The random
secret integer R2 (enclosed in Ω) is securely shared with the gateway through ZU .
Gateway decrypts the received message, ZG = D(W1, ZU) and verifies the timestamp,
T6 − T5. Timestamp verification shunts out the bogus (expired) and suspicious (replayed) requests.
Post verification, gateway prepares ρ1 and ρ2 for hiding the random secret integer R1, and parameter
W2, respectively. Subsequently, GW computes the πG {= E(W1, (ρ1 || ρ2 || T6))}, wherein ρ1 carries
hidden random secret integer (R1), ρ2 carries hidden parameter value (W2) which is required by
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the user to retrieve the R1 from ρ1, and T6 carries the present timestamp of the gateway. Thereafter,
the encrypted message, πG is sent to the user. Figure 5 illustrates the whole process of mutual
authentication and secret key generation phase.






R1 = W2 ⊕	ρ1  R2 = Ω ⊕ O1
W1 = ψ ⊕	O1















Figure 5. Mutual Authentication and Secret Key Generation Phase in MAKE-IT Protocol.
The user decrypts the received message, πU = D(W1, (ρ1 || ρ2 || T6)) and verifies the time
stamp, T7 − T6. The connection is either terminated if the timestamp is stale or continues otherwise.
Subsequently, user retrieves W2 (= ρ2 ⊕W1). The retrieved W2 is a key element required to recover
the hidden random secret integer, R1 (= W2 ⊕ ρ1).
Successful decryption of πU and ZG results in mutual authentication between the user and GW ,
respectively. Upon succeeding in mutual authentication, user and GW initiates the process of secret key
formation. The secret keys are generated using random secrets (R1 and R2) issued by AS. User and
GW have already exchanged the secret values required to form the secret key. Finally, user and the
gateway computes the secret key, SK = R1 ⊕ R2. The lifetime of the key depends upon the sensitivity
of the application and may vary from few days to couple of months.
5. Security Analysis
The robustness of the proposed MAKE-IT approach is tested through security analyzer tool and
informal analysis. This section demonstrates the test procedure and also presents the analysis of the
test results.
5.1. Formal Analysis
Following References [54,55], the performance of the proposed protocol has been tested under
the compromised conditions using AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols
and Applications). AVISPA is a security analyzer tool used to find vulnerabilities in the security
protocols. It works on HLPSL (High Level Protocol Specification Language) and use an interpreter,
HLPSL2IF which translates HLPSL to an Intermediate Format (IF). IF is presented as an input to the
various back ends of AVISPA (e.g., on-the-fly model-checker (OFMC), Constraint-Logic-based ATtack
SEarcher (CL-AtSe), etc.). The back ends compile the results and declare the protocol as safe or unsafe.
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We intentionally omitted the detailed discussion on the back ends of AVISPA, interested readers may
refer to Reference [56].
The initial process is to script the subjected protocol into HLPSL language. The script begins with
basic roles, followed by composition role, and ends with environment role. Basic roles declare the
agents, crypto operations, compromised channel (dolev-yao), and various processes that are carried
out locally by the agent. In contrast, composition roles declare the various legitimate entities that
participate in the conversation. A very careful scripting of environment role is required as it may decide
the effectiveness of this test. Environment role declares the global entities and constants. In addition,
environment role describes the role and knowledge of intruder followed by various sessions that may
exists during the communication. This role ends with the declaration of goals that defines the security
attributes taken into consideration.
To assess the strength of the MAKE-IT protocol, the mutual authentication and key exchange
phase has been scripted and examined on AVISPA. Note that notations used in HLPSL script is defined
in Table 2.
Table 2. Notations and Descriptions for the symbols used in High Level Protocol Specification Language
(HLPSL) script, Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA).
Notations Description Notations Description
U, Gw The user and gateway Pug, Prg Public and private key of gateway
SK Secret key SND, RCV Compromised sending and receiving wireless channels
Pieu, Pieg Alias πU , πG . Concatenation operation
Rho1, Rho2 Alias ρ1, ρ2 dy dolev-yao attack model
Psi Alias Ψ {X}_Y Encryption of component X with key, Y
secret, witness Security goals SU, RU Sending and receiving channel of user
Omega Alias Ω SGw, RGw Sending and receiving channel of gateway
sub1, sub2 Protocol ids i Intruder
Initially basic roles of the user and GW are declared that comprises of local agents (U, GW), crypto
operations (hash), description of keys (SK, PUG, etc.) and details of the compromised channel (dy)
used for communication. Additionally, it describes the various local constants and messages used and
exchanged during the conversation, respectively. User device gets activated in State = 0 (RCV(start))
whereas in State’:= 1 the user device generates a timestamp (T5′), and computes W1′. Afterwards,
user computes Zu′ = {Omega.T5}_W1 and forms the message, MI′ (= Zu′). The goal predicates set by
the user is the privacy of the data (Omega and T5′) along with the validation of the timestamp (T5) at
Gw. The encrypted message (MI′) is sent to the GW as shown in Figure 6.
GW receives the MI′ in State = 1 and begins processing in State′:= 2. The foremost task performed
by GW is the decryption of the received message, Zg′ = {Zu′}_W1. Post decryption, gateway
validates the timestamp (witness(Gw,U,user_gateway_t5,T5)) to avoid replay attacks. Upon successful
validation, GW computes Rho1′ (= xor(W2,R1)) and Rho2′ (= xor(W1,W2)). Subsequently, GW generates
a fresh timestamp (T6), and computes Pieg′ = {Rho1′.Rho2′.T6}_W1 and compiles a message MII′
(= Pieg′). The goal predicates set by the Gw is the privacy of the data (Rho1′ and Rho2′) along
with the validation of the timestamp (T6) at user. Thereafter, GW send the message to the user
for extracting the required information to generate secret keys. Consequently, user decrypts the
received message (MII′), Pieu′ = {Rho1′.Rho2′.T6}_W1. Post decryption, user validates the timestamp
(witness(U,Gw,gateway_user_t6,T6)). Successful decryption of Pieu′ and Zg′ results in mutual
authentication. Finally, user and GW use the retrieved information to generate the secret keys, SK.
Session role demonstrates the various constants, variables used by the entities
during the communication for example, User(U,Gw,Hash,Pug,Prg,SK,W1,SU,RU),
GW(U,Gw,Hash,Pug,Prg,SK,W1, SGw,RGw). On the contrary, environment role is very prominent
as it describes the constants and variables used globally by the agents. Furthermore, it describes
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the behaviour of the intruder{user, gateway,pug,prgi,ski,w1i,h}. Environment role also discusses the
organizations of various sessions that may takes place between legitimate and illegitimate entities,
for example, Session1 (user,gateway,h,pug,prg,sk, w1), Session2 (user,i,h,pug,prgi,ski,w1i), Session3
(i,gateway,h,pug,prgi,ski,w1i).File: /home/span/Desktop/IoT HAN Modified/IIOT NEW/Usernew Page 1 of 1
%Formal Verification of RLAS
role user (U,Gw         : agent,
           Hash         : hash_func,
           Pug    : public_key,
           SK,Prg,W1    : symmetric_key,
           SND, RCV     : channel (dy))





MI,MII                  :message
init State:= 0
transition
1. State = 0  /\ RCV(start)  =|>
  State':= 1  /\ T5'   := new()
              /\ W1'   := xor(Psi,O1)
              /\ Zu'   := {Omega.T5}_W1
      /\ MI'   := Zu'
              /\ SND(MI')
              /\ secret({Omega,T5'},sub1,{U,Gw})
              
2. State = 2  /\ RCV(MII')   =|>
   State':= 3 /\ Pieu' := {Rho1'.Rho2'.T6}_W1
              /\ witness(U,Gw,gateway_user_t6,T6)
              /\ W2'   := xor(Rho2',W1)     
      /\ R1'   := xor(W2',Rho1')
              /\ SK'   := xor(R1',R2)
end role
File: /home/span/Desktop/IoT HAN Modified/IIOT NEW/Gatewaynew Page 1 of 1
%Formal Verification of RLAS
role gateway (U,Gw         : agent,
      Hash         : hash_func,
              Pug    : public_key,
              SK,Prg,W1    : symmetric_key,
              SND,RCV      : channel (dy))
played_by Gw def= 
local 
State    :nat,
Zu,Zg,T5,Pieg,Omega,Rho1,
Rho2,T6,W2,R1,O1,R2        :text, 
MI,MII                     :message
init State:= 1
transition
1. State = 1  /\ RCV(MI')  =|>
   State':= 2 /\ Zg'   := {Zu'}_W1
              /\ witness(Gw,U,user_gateway_t5,T5)
              /\ Rho1' := xor(W2,R1)    
              /\ Rho2' := xor(W1,W2)
              /\ T6'   := new()
      /\ Pieg' := {Rho1'.Rho2'.T6}_W1
      /\ MII'  := Pieg'
              /\ SND (MII')
              /\ secret({Rho1',Rho2'},sub2,{Gw,U})
              /\ R2'   := xor(Omega,O1)
              /\ SK'   := xor(R1,R2')
end role
Figure 6. AVISPA Role Specification of the User and Gateway for our proposed MAKE-IT Protocol.
Finally, the environment role ends with declaration of goals of interest. The goals established to
evaluate the robustness of proposed protocol is depicted in Figure 7 and listed here:
1. Secrecy_of sub1 represents that {Omega; T5} are kept secret between user and gateway.
2. Authentication_on gateway_user_t6 states that the timestamp (i.e., T6) of the message {MII′} will
be validated at the user.
3. Authentication_on user_gateway_t5 states that the timestamp (i.e., T5) of the message MI′ will
be validated at the GW .
4. Secrecy_of sub2 represents that {Rho1; Rho2} are kept secret between gateway and user.
MAKE-IT approach has been tested on two back ends of AVISPA that is, OFMC and CL-AtSe
as illustrated in Figure 8. The Output file (OF) of OFMC and CL-AtSe backend clearly demonstrates
that no vulnerability has been identified and the protocol is declared safe to use in Internet of Things
applications. Conclusively, the protocol can withstand all the attacks mentioned in DY model while
still maintaining the data privacy, authenticity and integrity of communications.
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%Formal Verification of RLAS
role session (U,Gw       : agent,
              Hash       : hash_func,
              Pug     : public_key,
              SK,Prg,W1  : symmetric_key)
def=
local SU,RU,SGw,RGw      : channel(dy)
composition
   user(U,Gw,Hash,Pug,Prg,SK,W1,SU,RU) 
/\ gateway(U,Gw,Hash,Pug,Prg,SK,W1,SGw,RGw)
end role
File: /home/span/Desktop/IoT HAN Modified/IIOT NEW/environmentnew Page 1 of 1
%Formal Verification of RLAS
role environment ()
def=
const user,gateway             : agent,
pug                            : public_key,
sk,prg,ski,prgi,w1,w1i         : symmetric_key,
h                              : hash_func,
zu,zg,t5,pieu,pieg,omega,
rho1,rho2,t6,psi,o1,r2,w2,r1   : text,
gateway_user_t6,sub1,
user_gateway_t5,sub2           : protocol_id
intruder_knowledge={user,gateway,pug,prgi,ski,w1i,h}
composition
   session(user,gateway,h,pug,prg,sk,w1)
/\ session(user,i,h,pug,prgi,ski,w1i)









File: /home/span/Desktop/IoT HAN Modified/IIOT NEW/environmentnew Page 1 of 1
%Formal Verification of RLAS
role environment ()
def=
const user,gateway             : agent,
pug                            : public_key,
sk,prg,ski,prgi,w1,w1i         : symmetric_key,
h                              : hash_func,
zu,zg,t5,pieu,pieg,omega,
rho1,rho2,t6,psi,o1,r2,w2,r1   : text,
gateway_user_t6,sub1,
user_gateway_t5,sub2           : protocol_id
intruder_knowledge={user,gateway,pug,prgi,ski,w1i,h}
composition
   session(user,gateway,h,pug,prg,sk,w1)
/\ session(user,i,h,pug,prgi,ski,w1i)
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  searchTime  : 0.03s
  visitedNodes: 19 nodes
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  Analysed   : 0 states
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  Translation: 0.02 seconds
  Computation: 0.00 seconds
Figure 8. AVISPA results by using on-the-fly model-checker (OFMC) and Constraint-Logic-based
ATtack SEarcher (CL-AtSe) backend for our proposed MAKE-IT Protocol.
5.2. Informal Analysis
The informal security analysis of MAKE-IT approach has been discussed in this sub-section.
Theorem 1. Resistant to replay attacks.
Proof of Theorem 1. Freshness in each session is guaranteed as the messages (MN) are composed
of timestamps (TN). M1, M2, M3, M4, MI , and MI I , are all embedded with timestamps T1, T2,
T3, T4, T5, and T6, respectively. Any misuse of expired message can be easily traced, for example,
T2 − T1 ≤ ∆T. Assume an attacker eavesdropped the message, MI (Ω || T5) and replay later to GW
for getting unauthorized access. The GW receives the replayed message and decrypts, D(W1, (Ω ||
T5)′. Post decryption, GW verifies the timestamp and analyse that received message contains old
and expired timestamp, T6 − T5 > ∆T. The ∆T is usually kept very small to make it difficult for the
adversary to replay the captured messages within ∆T. The GW instead of processing further discards
the dishonest message. Additionally, the message MI is encrypted with the secret temporary session
key W1, hence making it computationally infeasible for the adversary to modify the timestamp (T5).
Therefore, proposed protocol is resilient to replay attacks.
Theorem 2. Resilient to man in the middle (MITM) attack.
Proof of Theorem 2. In MITM attack, adversary modifies the captured messages in such a way that
destination cannot differentiate the modified message from the original message. Assume an attacker
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performs MITM attack between user and the gateway by capturing and modifying the message
M′I (= E(W1, (Ω || T5)′). These computations are hard for attacker due to non availability of temporary
secret key (W1) required for deciphering the captured message D(W∗1 , (Ω || T5)) followed by ciphering
of modified message E(W∗1 , (Ω || T5)′). Therefore, attacker fails to attempt MITM attack between the
user and the gateway. Similarly, other messages M1, M2, M3, M4, and MI I are also encrypted and
hence cannot be modified. Therefore, the proposed scheme is protected from MITM attacks.
Theorem 3. Secured against modification attack.
Proof of Theorem 3. Integrity is preserved due to use of one way hash function (i.e., SHA),
for example, the element O = hash (τ) guarantees prevention against modification attacks. Any form of
alterations in O can be easily identified during reconstruction and comparison of hash at other entity
for example, O′1 == O1. Apart from one way hash functions, the messages exchanged are encrypted
to ensure that integrity of the communication is retained. Assume if attacker captures the message
MI I {= E(W1, (ρ1 || ρ2 || T6))} and tries to modify {= E(W?1 , (ρ1 || ρ2 || T6)∗)}. However, it is
computationally difficult for the attacker to make any changes as the information is encrypted with
the temporary secret key, W1. Neither the key nor the security credentials (random secrets) are ever
shared in plain text over the unsecured medium. Therefore, attacker does not find way to modify the
content. Similarly, other messages M1, M2, M3, M4, and MI are ciphered to prevent modifications.
Thus, proposed scheme is secured against modification attack.
Theorem 4. Secure secret key generation.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proposed scheme ensures the secrecy during formation of secret key, SK.
Secret key is formed using random secrets (R1, R2) generated by trusted and tamper proof entity, AS.
User shares R2 with gateway through message MI (= Ω || T5). Likewise, gateway shares R1 with
user through MI I (= ρ1 || ρ2 || T6). Both GW and user retrieve R2 & R1 from MI and MI I , respectively.
Finally, user and gateway generate a shared secret key, SK = R1 ⊕ R2. As the keys are formed using
random secrets which were never shared with anyone, therefore proposed protocol adheres to security
measures while forming the secret key. The compliance to security measures ensures that secret key
generated is not compromised and can be used for securing future communications.
Theorem 5. Proposed scheme exhibits data confidentiality.
Proof of Theorem 5. Revealing of information to untrusted entities can pose serious threats to the
existence of IIoT networks. Assume an attacker eavesdrop a message, M3 (= E(PUAS, ψ)). In spite of
successful eavesdropping, the attacker would not be able to interpret the information due to the non
availability of the private key of AS, D(PR?AS, ψ). The AS has never shared its private key (PRAS) with
anyone, therefore, the attacker remains unsuccessful in obtaining the information from the captured
message, M3. In another instance, lets assume that attacker has captured, MI I {= E(W1, (ρ1 || ρ2 ||
T6))}. The attacker has intentions to retrieve W2 and R1 from the captured message, MI I . Despite
the successful capturing of MI I , the attacker would not be able to recover W2 and R1 from ρ1 and ρ2,
respectively as the attacker needs a temporary secret key (W1) to decipher the information {= D(W?1 ,
(ρ1 || ρ2 || T6))}; the temporary secret key (W1) is shared amongst legitimate entities only. Similarly,
the messages M1, M2, M4, and MI are also encrypted, therefore, confidentiality of the information is
ensured at all levels of communication. The attacker does not have these keys, PRG, PRAS, O2, and W1,
to recover the overall information exchanged between the IIoT network entities. The proposed scheme
exhibits the security property of data confidentiality.
Sensors 2020, 20, 5166 16 of 21
Theorem 6. MAKE-IT achieves identity anonymity.
Proof of Theorem 6. Identity anonymity is desirous to prevent the network from flooding based
attacks, location aware attacks, and impersonation attacks, and so forth. MAKE-IT never discloses the
identities of the network nodes to any unauthorized entity. Only AS has prepared an offline database
of identities for verification purposes. AS is a trusted entity and stores the information in tamper proof
memory, therefore any access or modification by the attacker is not possible. Even the parties involved
in the communication does not know the real identities of each other, their identity details are hashed
before being shared. Consider an attacker intercepted the message M3 = E(PUAS, Ψ) containing the
hashed identity details of the GW , still the attacker would not be able to interpret the identity due to
hashing (W = hash (SG || PG || LG || MG || GID)) and ciphering of information, E(PUAS). The attacker
does not have the private key of AS (PRAS) to decipher the information. Therefore, MAKE-IT keeps
the communication anonymous by not revealing the identities of user, gateway, and AS during the
exchange of messages.
6. Performance and Comparative Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol in terms of storage overhead,
computational and communication cost. This section also presents the comparison analysis of proposed
MAKE-IT approach with the traditional schemes [2,3,23–27] in terms of robustness against attacks and
attainment of security features.
The storage cost requirement for implementing the proposed MAKE-IT approach is presented
in Table 3. Total storage cost (all phases) of User, GW and AS are 264 bytes, 210 bytes, and 187 bytes,
respectively. The storage space available in the CM5000 Telos B mote [57] (resource constrained
device) is 1 MB, whereas the storage requirement to execute the proposed protocol (all phases) is just
0.02% of the total available memory space. The MAKE-IT approach achieves the goal of performing
mutual authentication and key exchange with a small storage requirement. Apparently, the storage
requirements are very nominal, thus making a way for its (MAKE-IT) applicability in all possible use
cases of IIoT.
Table 3. Storage cost of proposed protocol.
Parameter Size (Bytes) User Authentication Server Gateway
β, ν, YU , ZU , πU 16, 24, 48, 24, 40 X
τ, UIDS, ∀, YAS, Σ 24, 1, 24, 48, 26 X
O1, O2 16, 16 X X
R1, R2 16, 16 X X X
λ, ρ1, πG, Ψ, ZG 26, 16, 40, 24, 24 X
W1, W2, SK 16, 16, 16 X X
Total cost (bytes) 264 187 210
Table 4 demonstrates the computational cost spent by different entities (User, GW and AS) in all
phases (user device registration, mutual authentication and key exchange) whereas Table 5 compares
the computational cost requirements of proposed scheme with existing state of the art schemes. It can
be clearly witnessed that the proposed scheme has less computations, thus imposing less burden
on device processing, storage and battery resources. Note that we have only compared for mutual
authentication and key exchange phase as the registration phase occurs once during initialization.
Sensors 2020, 20, 5166 17 of 21
Table 4. Computational cost of proposed protocol.
Phase I Phase II Total cost
User CE + CD + CH + CXOR CE + CD + 4 ∗ CXOR 2 ∗ CE + 2 ∗ CD + CH + 5 ∗ CXOR
AS
2 ∗ CE + 2 ∗ CD + CH +
2 ∗ Cran + CXOR
- 2 ∗ CE + 2 ∗ CD + CH + 2 ∗ Cran + CXOR
Gateway CE + CD + CH + CXOR CE + CD + 3 ∗ CXOR 2 ∗ CE + 2 ∗ CD + CH + 4 ∗ CXOR
Total Cost
4 ∗ CE + 4 ∗ CD + 3 ∗ CH
+ 2 ∗ Cran + 3 ∗ CXOR
2 ∗ CE + 2 ∗ CD + 7 ∗ CXOR
6 ∗ CE + 6 ∗ CD + 3 ∗ CH + 2 ∗ Cran
+ 10 ∗ CXOR
Acronyms: C: Computation, E: Encryption, D: Decryption, XOR: Ex-or operation, H: Hash, ran:
random number generation, Phase I: User device registration, Phase I I: Mutual authentication and secret
key generation.
We have considered the Telos mote for calculating the communication cost of our scheme.
Telos mote consumes 0.81 µJ and 0.72 µJ of energy for receiving and transmitting one bit,
respectively [57]. Table 6 furnish the total communication cost spent by GW and User for performing
mutual authentication and secret key generation. The results clearly signifies the efficiency of proposed
scheme. The proposed protocol consumes only 385 µJ of energy whereas [2,3,23–27], consumes 768 µJ,
749 µJ, 658 µJ, 739 µJ, 742 µJ, 698 µJ, and 1411 µJ of energy, respectively. Therefore, existing schemes
are not suitable for resource constrained environment of IIoT.
Table 5. Computation cost comparison with different schemes.
Schemes Resource Constrained Device
[2] 7 ∗ CH + Cran + 6 ∗ CXOR
[3] 4 ∗ CE + 8 ∗ CH
[23] 9 ∗ CH + 5 ∗ CXOR
[24] 9 ∗ CH + Cran + 4 ∗ CXOR
[25] 15 ∗ CH + 10 ∗ CXOR
[26] 10 ∗ CH + CXOR
[27] 12 ∗ CH + 2 ∗ Cran + 8 ∗ CXOR
MAKE-IT CE + CD + 4 ∗ CXOR
Table 6. Communication energy cost.
Schemes Transmission (µJ) Reception (µJ)
Total Energy
Consumption (µJ)
[2] 459 309 768
[3] 229 520 749
[23] 371 287 658
[24] 348 391 739
[25] UD 742 742
[26] 279 419 698
[27] 371 1040 1411
MAKE-IT 230 155 385
Acronyms: UD : Undisclosed.
The robustness of the proposed protocol has been verified and presented in this section.
The various security features offered by the proposed protocol accompanied with the list of attacks
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resisted by the protocol is presented in Table 7. It is observed from the Table that the proposed scheme
exhibits strong protection against potential attacks and performs better in comparison to traditional
schemes [2,3,23–27].
Table 7. Analysis and Comparison of Protocols based on protection against attacks and security goals.
Attacks [2] [3] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] MAKE-IT
Replay attack X X X X X X X X
Man in the middle attack X × X × X × X X
Modification attack X X X X X X X X
Impersonation attack X X X X X X X X
Mutual authentication X X X X X X X X
Secure secret key × × X X X X X X
Prevention from unauthorized access X X X X X X X X
Data confidentiality × × P × × × × X
Identity anonymity P X P X P P X X
Acronyms: X: Protected against attacks/Compliance to security goals, ×: Vulnerable against attacks/non
compliance to security goals, P : Partially achieved.
Figure 9 illustrates the number of messages exchanged by the resource constrained device during
mutual authentication and key exchange phase. It is found during analysis that proposed scheme
exchanges only 2 messages in comparison to 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, and 6 messages of scheme [2,3,23–27],


























Figure 9. Communication Cost Comparison in terms of the number of message exchanges.
7. Conclusions & Future Scope
In this paper, we propose a lightweight remote user mutual authentication and key exchange
model for IIoT. Industrial network can be protected from external threats if authenticity verification
is performed before allowing any entity to access the network resources. The proposed scheme uses
symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography, hash, timestamps, and so forth and various other
crypto primitives to achieve secure mutual authentication and key exchange. The robustness of the
scheme against attacks (replay attacks, modification attacks, and man in the middle attacks, etc.) is
evaluated using formal and informal security analysis. The scheme proposed can withstand many
popular attacks and offer many security features like data confidentiality, identity anonymity, integrity,
and so forth. Further the proposed scheme is found to be resource efficient in terms of computation
and communication. All these advantages of proposed protocol over existing schemes paves a path
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for its use in IIoT applications. The proposed scheme can further be extended in future to protect
the industrial IoT networks from internal threats as well. Future work might also consider having
a comparison of MAKE-IT protocol with TCP-UDP/IP security protocols under different network
settings and parameters. Especially observing the performance comparison of our MAKE-IT protocol
against others under the industrial network environment settings (where network delay is up most
important) would be appealing.
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